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'\l3~fj n frlg ",D isab11 ity":
The Approach to Follow
by Theodore J. St. Antoine
_,.,-'

The deficition of "disabiJity" has
once again become a central issue in
workers' compensation law. I am partly
responsible. A decade ago I served as
the Governor's Special Counselor on
Workers' Compensation. In my Reportto the Cabinet Council on Jobs and
Economic Development, I stated: "Ifl
could write on a clean slate, I would
prefer to see the M.ichigan definition
brought even closer into the mainstream of American law by decJaring
that 'disability' means a 'limitation of
an employee's wage earning capacity
~-- in work suitable to his or her qualificaF tions and training resulting from a personal injury or work related disease."'
T. St. Antoine, Workers' Compensa-
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on Workers' Comaensallon

tion in Michiga11: Costs, Benefits, and
Fairness, 27 (1984).
Since the Michigan Legislature
had gone through an arduous struggJe
as recently as 1981 to define "disability" for the first time with regard to
personal injury, I recommended against
any further tinkering right then with
the new statutory definition. I also
thought the change would "probably
be of small practical consequence."
Ibid. Despite that admonition, the Legislature proceeded in 1987 to ad opt my
"clean slate" phraseology verbatim and
incorporate it into Section 418.301(4)
of the act.
My proposed language was based
on the definition in the classic treatise
of the late Arthur Larson, acknowledged as the country's foremost authorityon workers' compensation Jaw.
As I said in my Report, the effect of the
change would be to substitute Larson's
formulation, "work suitable to
claimant's qualifications and training,"

/

for tbe 1981language referring to the
"employee's general field of employment." The difference was to shift attention from the kind of work an employee was in fact doing to the kind of
work the employee was qualified to do.
But there was no change, proposed or
enacted, in the preexisting language of
Section 418.301(4) that "disability"
meant "a limitation of an employee's
wage earning capacity..."(emphasis
supplied).
In drafting a statute, one should
not be so presumptuous as to think that
all conceivable cases and issues to
arise in the future can be anticipated
and resolved in advance. But at least
one can lay down some general guidelines and provide some sense of the
approach to be followed in interpreting
and applying a new statutory provision. The clearly stated purpose of my
proposed language, which the Legisla·
ture adopted exactly as I suggested,
was to bring the Michigan definition of
"disability" closer into the "mainstream
of American law" by substituting Professor Larson's phraseology for that of
the 1981legislation. Larson'sownsummation of the main body of compensation doctrine is therefore the surest
guide to the proper interpretation ofthe
1987 amendment.
Moreover, as I emphasized in my
1984 Report, even the Legislature's
original 1981 definition of "disability," with its reference to "a limitation
of an employee's wage earning capacity in the employee's general field of
employment" (emphasis supplied), was
designed to rid the Michigan system of
a judge-imposed notion that "disability" meant an "inability to do the work

the claimant was doing at the time of
injury." St. Antoine, supra, at 23-24,
27. That led to "freakish" results, to use
Arthur Larson's term. An example was
the case of the skilled coal miner who
was so badly burned in a mine explosion that he could not stand exposure to
summer heat or winter cold, but who
was held to have no permanent disability at all because he could resume his
work in tbe relatively constant temperatures underground (until the mine
closed for economic reasons). Kaarto v
Calumet& Hecla, Inc., 367 Mich 128
(1962).
In addition, I emphasized that the
only way to achieve a dramatic reduction in eligibility for wage loss benefits
by a change in the definition of "disability" would be through the sort of
extremely strict definition employed
in Social Security disability determi·
nations. St. Antoine, supra, at 27-28,
citing 42 USC § 423 (d}(2)(A). The
Legislature obviously did not pursue
that course in amending Section
418.301(4). In contrast, it did impose a
far stricter standard of disability in
Section 418.373 to disqualify persons
receiving nondisability pensions or
retirement benefits ("unable ... to
perfonnworksuitabletotheemployee's
qualifications . . . ") (emphasis supplied).
The current dispute over "disability" under Section 418.301(4) pits two
opposingviewsagainst each other. One
position is that it requires "only a limitation, not total limitation, of wage. earning capacity in work suitable to
qualifications and training" (emphasis
in the original). Harris v United Tech-
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nologies, 1989 ACO #222, 1989 ACO
1087, 112 MIWCLR 1190 (1989). The
other view is that the "relevant in·
quiry" is "whether the plaintiff bas the
ability to work at any other type of job
by virtue of his or her qualifications
and training" (emphasis supplied),
Hooker v US Mfg., 1992 ACO #346,
1992 Mich ACO 1053, 115 :MIWCLR
1275 (1992), and "if an employee is
found able to do any of those jobs, the
employee cannot be found to be di sabled" (emphasis supplied), Paquin v
AZCO-Hennes, 1992AC0#364, 1992
Mich ACO 1112, 115 MIWCLR 1292
(1992).
Understandably, employers are
concerned that under the first analysis,
workers' compensation could become
a high-benefit form of unemployment
compensatio n, especially in peri~ds of
recession. But this is what ArthurLarson
has to say: " [An] injured claimant may
honestly represent to the Employment
Security office that he is able to do
some work, and with equal honesty tell
the Compensation Board later that he
w as totally disabled during the same
period since, ahhougb be could have
done some kinds ofwork, no one would
give him a job because of his physical
handicaps" (emphasissupplied).lCA.
Larson, The Law of Workmen 's Com·
pensation § 57.65, p.10-492.50 (199.3).
Even more to the point, Larson
repeatedly cites USF&G Ins. Co. v.
Giles, 340 SE 2d 284 (Ga App 1986),
as " bris kl y" handling a problem that
bas troubled suc h a maj or wage-loss
state as Florida. See Larson, supra, §
57.22(c), p. 10-189. In Giles, an employee resigned his job as claims adjuster for USF&G after suffering a car
accident on the job and took a similar
position with CNA. Later the employee
was laid off by CNA because of a
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reduction in force. Giles bad experience as a construction worker and athletic coach, and could have obtained
such employment but for his workrelated injury. The court sustained a
finding of total disability. Larson quotes
the court as follows: "It is not the
ability to perform the particular job in
which one is engaged at the time of
injury which is the determining factor
in a case such as this, but rather w hethe r
the claimant's inability to find any
work for which he is suited by training
and experience is a result of the injury
s uffered" (emphasis in the original).
Speaking generally, Larson observes: "It is unifomlly held . . ., without regard to statutory variations in the
phrasing of the test, that a finding of
disability may stand even when there is
evidence of some actual post-injury
earnings equaling or exceeding those
received before the accident." Larson,
s~p~a. § 57.21_(c),p.l0-136. This analyS IS 1s wholl y m keeping with the plain
wording of Section 418.301(4), which
speaks ofdisability as "a" limitation on
wage·earning capacity, not as the total
elimination of that capacity.
Thus, it should follow that if an
employee is qu al ified to do three jobs,
and a work-related injury prevents her
from doing one of them, she has a
"disability," even though she remains
quite capable of performing the other
two. Hooker and Paquin, cited above,
are of course to the contrary. (The
recent Court of Appeals decision in
Soboti«J vChrysler Corp. (No. 139559,
3/11/93) is not necessa rily in conflict
since it deals with a pre-1982 injury:
before there was any applicable statutory defi nition of "disability.")
Naturally, the set-off provisions
ofSections 418.301(5)(b), 418.361(1 ),
and 418.371(1) provide for appropriate deductions from the compensa tion
othe':"'ise due an injured employee
who IS able to obtain gainful employmen~ in spite of his injury. Similarly,
Sechon 418 .301(5)(a) disqualifies an

